De-theologizing God

De-theologizing God

What We Talk About When We Talk About God

ARTICLE BY MICHAEL KRUGER  MAY 2013
belltalkaboutgod93.jpg

Rob Bell, What We Talk About When We Talk About God (New York: HarperOne, 2013), 240 pp., $16.00
“Detheologizing” Christianity
For those who have read Rob Bell’s other books (such as Love Wins andVelvet Elvis), the tone, disposition, and content of this new book will sound all too familiar.  InWhat We Talk About When We Talk About God, Bell continues his campaign to reshape and repackage Christianity for this postmodern generation, and to rescue it from those he thinks are holding it back (traditional Christians).
In this way, Bell positions himself as an apologist of sorts. Our world views the Christian God as irrelevant and outdated (like an Oldsmobile), and Bell’s mission is to give Him an extreme makeover. Bell takes the God who seems like a grumpy, judgmental old man in a polyester suit who is pointing his finger at you while simultaneously thumping the Bible, and changes him into a hip, urban young guy with skinny jeans and horn-rimmed glasses who invites you to have a latte with him and ponder the mysteries of the universe.
Bell’s book, therefore, functions a lot like the Apple vs. Microsoft commercial that was popular a number of years ago. Microsoft was represented by an out of shape, poorly dressed geek, while Apple was represented by a thin, hip, well-dressed urbanite. In effect, Bell is arguing that God is not like Microsoft. He is more like Apple. God is relevant. He can keep up with the times.
Unfortunately, being an apologist for the faith does not always lead one to uphold the faith.  Indeed, there is a long history of folks who have sought to defend Christianity from critical attacks by simply changing the problematic portions of the faith. In other words, apologetics is not always about defending what we believe, but is sometimes about modifying what we believe.  Apologetics is sometimes about giving Christianity an extreme makeover.
In this regard, one thinks of scholars like Rudolph Bultmann. Despite the negative press Bultmann has received, it should be noted that Bultmann regarded himself as a committed Christian and a defender of the faith. Bultmann recognized that in this modern, enlightened age, people could no longer believe in supernatural events. So, in order to rescue Christianity from its imminent demise, Bultmann stripped all the supernatural elements out of the faith (see his book, New Testament and Mythology). In short, he “demythologized” the Bible. Bultmann wanted to convince people that God wasn’t an Oldsmobile. God could keep up with the times.
Of course, Bell’s method of defending Christianity is not by stripping it of its supernatural elements (that was the issue in Bultmann’s day). On the contrary, Bell is quite keen to remind the reader of the supernatural–God is everywhere, busy at work, in us and in our world.   Instead, Bell’s makeover method is to change Christianity into a broad “spirituality.”  His book downplays (and in some instances, simply ignores) many of the key doctrines that make Christianity distinctive. He simply turns Christianity into vague, general, theism. Whereas Bultmann demythologized the faith, Bell has detheologized the faith.
Bell’s makeover motif is evident from the very opening chapter, entitled “Hum.” He complains that there are many “conventional categories” of belief that are harmful to the church. His examples include the belief that women shouldn’t be pastors, the belief that “everybody that is gay is going to hell,” and the belief that non-Christians will endure “untold suffering” after the second coming of Christ (p.6-7). These are the types of beliefs (though not all) that Christianity must rid itself of, if it is to avoid going the way of the Oldsmobile.
In chapter two, entitled “Open,” Bell offers modified form of the teleological argument. He goes into great detail about the order and the complexity of the universe in an effort to show the skeptic that you can’t rule out the existence of God–the universe is too marvelous, too complex, to be sure there is no divine. I think this chapter will be effective with the non-Christian, and is probably the best (and most interesting ) chapter in the book.
In chapter three, entitled “Both,” Bell returns more directly to his makeover motif. The overall point of this chapter is that the language we use to describe God is inherently and unavoidably vague–God is beyond words. And if God is beyond our ability to explain, then we cannot really be certain in our beliefs about God. Bell laments those fundamentalist types who process God in either/or categories. “There are limits to our certainty because God, it’s repeated again and again, is spirit.  And spirit has no shape or form” (p. 88).
It is clear that Bell is using this chapter to set the stage for his makeover. If words about God are unclear, and we can never really be certain about anything, then we should not feel bound by certain limitations about God. This allows Bell to scold those “fundamentalist” types who are all too certain about their theology, and it allows him to suggest that we should think of God differently. In particular, Bell hones in on the issue of God’s gender. He argues that masculine language in the Bible about God is just the product of primitive cultures that couldn’t help but think of their “god” as male (p.88-89).
In chapter four, entitled “With,” Bell focuses on the immanence of God and how he is always near and present with us. This would be fine if Bell stuck to biblical categories about the way that God is present. But, instead he “detheologizes” the Christian view of God’s immanence and makes it more like New Age, Gnostic spiritualism. God’s presence is described in language like “creative energy,” a “life force,” and an “unending divine vitality” (p. 106). This divine energy creates a oneness to the universe: “When we talk about God, we’re talking about the straightforward affirmation that everything has a singular, common source and is infinitely, endlessly, deeply connected” (p.118).  This sounds more like “the Force” from Star Wars, than the God of the Bible.
In chapter five, entitled “For,” Bell says that he wants to recover the “fundamental Christian message that God is for us” (128). That is certainly a commendable goal, but Bell once again “detheologizes” what this concept actually means according to Scripture. Entirely missing in this chapter–indeed entirely missing in the whole book–is any meaningful discussion of the cross and atonement. Absent is discussion about our sin, God’s wrath on our sin, and how Christ’s death on the cross paid that penalty. Absent is the clarification that without the cross, God is definitely not for us and that his wrath remains on us. Sure, Bell talks about Jesus and the incarnation. But, the mission of Jesus is reshaped so that its purpose is “giving us a picture of God who is not distant or detached or indifferent to our pain…but instead is present among us in Jesus to teach us and help us and suffer with us” (p. 131).
In the final two chapters, Bell continues to talk about key Christian themes such as Jesus, repentance, confession, forgiveness, and so on. But, incredibly, he empties each of these terms of their biblical meaning and simply replaces them with a meaning that fits with postmodern spirituality. His “detheologizing” of Christianity is complete.
In the end, my overall concern about this volume is a simple one: it is not Christian. Bell’s makeover of Christianity has changed it into something entirely different. It is not Christianity at all, it is modern liberalism. It is the same liberalism that Machen fought in the 1920’s and the same liberalism prevalent in far too many churches today. It is the liberalism that teaches that God exists and that Jesus is the source of our happiness and our fulfillment, but all of this comes apart from any real mention of sin, judgment, and the cross. It is the liberalism that says we can know nothing for sure, except of course, that those “fundamentalists” are wrong. It is the liberalism that appeals to the Bible from time to time, but then simply ignores large portions of it.
Bell’s book, therefore, is really just spiritualism with a Christian veneer. It’s a book that would fit quite well on Oprah’s list of favorite books. What is Rob Bell talking about when he is talking about God? Not the God of Christianity.
Dr. Michael Kruger is President and Professor of New Testament at Reformed Theological Seminary in Charlotte, NC. You can read more of Dr. Kruger’s writings here.

Logos (not the software)

Logos (not the software)

Logos

Posted on May 13, 2013 by Hal Hammons

Call me unreasonable, call me paranoid, but I have to say, I feel a bit weird sharing the road with drivers who have NASCAR logos on their vehicles.  If Tony Stewart sticker guy thinks I should have used my turn signal more judiciously, will he feel justified in getting me loose and putting me into the wall?  And what if I find myself between him and Jeff Gordon sticker guy?  Maybe that would be a good time for me to make a pit stop.

I get it, though.  Logos are intended to imply affiliation, not direct identification.  If I put a Houston Astros sticker on my car, it would not make my neighbors fear I might get out of my car and swing at their heads with a baseball bat — and miss, pulling a hamstring.  It would just tell them I like a team with a lower winning percentage than the batting average of its best player.  Chicago Cub fans out there, from all of us Astros fans, you’re welcome.

The associations we claim say a great deal about us.  If I wear a restaurant’s logo on my shirt, people can safely assume I like the restaurant.  It may be that I hate the place, that it’s my wife’s shirt, and that it’s the only clean shirt in the house.  But it’s unlikely anyone will assume that.

No one is going to hell for plugging the wrong restaurant or driver.  But if we are promoting a product, person or industry that is actively opposed to the principles of God, are we not a partaker in evil deeds (2 John 11)?  Can we expose the deeds of darkness (Ephesians 5:11) while shilling for them?

Don’t let your attachment to carnal things cover up your attachment to Jesus.  That’s all I’m saying.

Why Men Have Stopped Singing in Church

Why Men Have Stopped Singing in Church

Why men have stopped singing in church

May 8, 2013 By 

Worship BandIt happened again yesterday. I was attending one of those hip, contemporary churches — and almost no one sang. Worshippers stood obediently as the band rocked out, the smoke machine belched and lights flashed. Lyrics were projected on the screen, but almost no one sang them. A few women were trying, but I saw only one male (other than the worship leader) making the attempt.

A few months ago I blogged, “Have Christians Stopped Singing?” I did some research, and learned that congregational singing has ebbed and flowed over the centuries. It reached a high tide when I was a young man – but that tide may be going out again. And that could be bad news for men.

First, a very quick history of congregational singing.

Before the Reformation, laypersons were not allowed to sing in church. They were expected to stand mute as sacred music was performed by professionals (priests and cantors), played on complex instruments (pipe organs), and sung in an obscure language (Latin).

Reformers gave worship back to the people in the form of congregational singing. They composed simple tunes that were easy to sing, and mated them with theologically rich lyrics. Since most people were illiterate in the 16th century, singing became an effective form of catechism. Congregants learned about God as they sang about God.

A technological advance – the printing press – led to an explosion of congregational singing. The first hymnal was printed in 1532, and soon a few dozen hymns became standards across Christendom. Hymnals slowly grew over the next four centuries. By the mid 20th century every Protestant church had a hymnal of about 1000 songs, 250 of which were regularly sung. In the church of my youth, everyone picked up a hymnal and sang every verse of every song.

About 20 years ago a new technological advance – the computer controlled projection screen – entered America’s sanctuaries. Suddenly churches could project song lyrics for all to see. Hymnals became obsolete. No longer were Christians limited to 1,000 songs handed down by our elders.

At first, churches simply projected the songs everyone knew – hymns and a few simple praise songs that had come out of the Jesus Movement. People sang robustly.

But that began to change about ten years ago. Worship leaders realized they could project anything on that screen. So they brought in new songs each week. They drew from the radio, the Internet, and Worship conferences. Some began composing their own songs, performing them during worship, and selling them on CD after church.

In short order we went from 250 songs everyone knows to 250,000+ songs nobody knows.

Years ago, worship leaders used to prepare their flocks when introducing a new song. “We’re going to do a new song for you now,” they would say. “We’ll go through it twice, and then we invite you to join in.”

That kind of coaching is rare today. Songs get switched out so frequently that it’s impossible to learn them. People can’t sing songs they’ve never heard. And with no musical notes to follow, how is a person supposed to pick up the tune?

And so the church has returned to the 14th century. Worshippers stand mute as professional-caliber musicians play complex instruments, sung in an obscure language. Martin Luther is turning over in his grave.

What does this mean for men? On the positive side, men no longer feel pressure to sing in church. Men who are poor readers or poor singers no longer have to fumble through hymnals, sing archaic lyrics or read a musical staff.

But the negatives are huge. Men are doers, and singing was one of the things we used to do together in church. It was a chance to participate. Now, with congregational singing going away, and communion no longer a weekly ordinance, there’s only one avenue left for men to participate in the service – the offering. Is this really the message we want to send to men? Sit there, be quiet, and enjoy the show. And don’t forget to give us money.

There’s nothing wrong with professionalism and quality in church music. The problem isn’t the rock band, or the lights, or the smoke machine. The key is familiarity. People enjoy singing songs they know.

How do I know? When that super-hip band performed a hymn, the crowd responded with gusto. People sang. Even the men.

Guardian: Hanging Gardens of……

Guardian: Hanging Gardens of……

Babylon’s hanging garden: ancient scripts give clue to missing wonder

A British academic has gathered evidence suggesting garden was created at Nineveh, 300 miles from Babylon

Babylon’s hanging garden: ancient scripts give clue missing wonder

Stephanie Dalley pieced together ancient texts to reveal a garden that recreated a mountain landscape. Photograph: Bettmann/Corbis

The whereabouts of one of the seven wonders of the ancient world – the fabled Hanging Garden of Babylon – has been one of the great mysteries from antiquity. The inability of archaeologists to find traces of it among Babylon’s ancient remains led some even to doubt its existence.

Now a British academic has amassed a wealth of textual evidence to show that the garden was instead created at Nineveh, 300 miles from Babylon, in the early 7th century BC.

After 18 years of study, Stephanie Dalley of Oxford University has concluded that the garden was built by the Assyrians in the north of Mesopotamia – in modern Iraq – rather than by their great enemies the Babylonians in the south.

She believes her research shows that the feat of engineering and artistry was achieved by the Assyrian king, Sennacherib, rather than the Babylonian king, Nebuchadnezzar.

The evidence presented by Dalley, an expert in ancient Middle Eastern languages, emerged from deciphering Babylonian and Assyrian cuneiform scripts and reinterpreting later Greek and Roman texts. They included a 7th-century BC Assyrian inscription that, she discovered, had been mistranslated in the 1920s, reducing passages to “absolute nonsense”.

She was astonished to find Sennacherib’s own description of an “unrivalled palace” and a “wonder for all peoples”. He describes the marvel of a water-raising screw made using a new method of casting bronze – and predating the invention of Archimedes’ screw by some four centuries.

Dalley said this was part of a complex system of canals, dams and aqueducts to bring mountain water from streams 50 miles away to the citadel of Nineveh and the hanging garden. The script records water being drawn up “all day”.

Location of the 'Hanging Gardens'

Recent excavations have found traces of aqueducts. One near Nineveh was so vast that Dalley said its remains looked like a stretch of motorway from the air, and it bore a crucial inscription: “Sennacherib king of the world … Over a great distance I had a watercourse directed to the environs of Nineveh …”

Having first broached her theory in 1992, Dalley is now presenting a mass of evidence in a book, The Mystery of the Hanging Garden of Babylon, which Oxford University Press publishes on 23 May. She expects to divide academic opinion, but the evidence convinces her that Sennacherib’s garden fulfils the criteria for a wonder of the world – “magnificent in conception, spectacular in engineering, and brilliant in artistry”.

Dalley said: “That the Hanging Garden was built in Babylon by Nebuchadnezzar the Great is a fact learned at school and … ‘verified’ in encyclopaedias … To challenge such a universally accepted truth might seem the height of arrogance, revisionist scholarship … But Assyriology is a relatively recent discipline … Facts that once seemed secure become redundant.”

Sennacherib’s palace, with steps of semi-precious stone and an entrance guarded by colossal copper lions, was magnificent. Dalley pieced together ancient texts to reveal a garden that recreated a mountain landscape. It boasted terraces, pillared walkways, exotic plants and trees, and rippling streams.

The seven wonders appear in classical texts written centuries after the garden was created, but the 1st-century historian Josephus was the only author to name Nebuchadnezzar as creator of the Hanging Garden, Dalley said. She found extensive confusion over names and places in ancient texts, including the Book of Judith, muddling the two kings.

Little of Nineveh – near present-day Mosul – has so far been explored, because it has been judged too dangerous until now to conduct excavations.

New Testament Documents – Authorship and Dates

New Testament Documents – Authorship and Dates

Expository Files 20.5 – May 2013

New Testament Documents – Date & Authorship — By Steve Wolfgang

“In my opinion, every book of the New Testament was written by a baptized Jew between the forties and the eighties of the first century (very probably sometime between about A.D. 50 and 75).” – William F. Albright, Johns Hopkins University (1963, p.4)

Almost a half-century ago, when I first began to think seriously about various controversies over the dating and authorship of New Testament documents, one of the first things I encountered was this then-newly-minted comment by one of the world’s leading archaeologists, William F. Albright. While that comment was made a few years before his death in an interview in the evangelical magazine, Christianity Today, it was by no means a spur-of-the moment interjection common in interviews. Albright had previously written, in light of archaeological discoveries (his area of scholarly expertise), that “[t]hanks to the Qumran discoveries [the Dead Sea Scrolls], the New Testament proves to be in fact what it was formerly believed to be: the teaching of Christ and his immediate followers between circa 25 and circa 80 A.D” (Albright, 1957, p. 23).

What I have learned since encountering Albright’s comment has only caused me to see more clearly why this accomplished archaeologist said what he did. Interestingly, Albright’s assessment is not unique among unlikely sources of such assessments. Possibly the most unlikely source is the staunch atheist and eugenics advocate H.G. Wells (unfortunately much more widely known and read than Albright), who also acknowledged that the four gospels “were certainly in existence a few decades after [Christ’s] death” (498). Unless one reads documents through the lens of a apriori assumptions, the evidence supports the conclusions that the historical accounts, letters, biography, and other genres found in the New Testament were written by eyewitnesses and other persons living in that historical period with access to written sources and persons knowledgeable about the events

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described. The New Testament is not the stuff of mythology or fiction, as the early and wide accessibility of the documents attest.

Background: Various Theories and Proposals

Obviously, the dates and time frames for the authorship of the various documents are significant issues in an apologetic argument for Christianity. Confidence in the historical accuracy of these documents depends partly on whether they were written by eyewitnesses and contemporaries to the events described, as many New Testament texts claim. Some critical scholars have attempted to strengthen their contentions by separating the actual events from the writings by as much time as possible. For this reason radical scholars (for example, the “Jesus Seminar”) argue for late first century or even second century dates for the original manuscripts. Invoking these dates barely opens the door to argue that the New Testament documents, especially the Gospels, are “mythological” and that the writers created the events contained in them, rather than simply reporting them. As Oxford historian A.N. Sherwin White has demonstrated, using documents from antiquity even less well-attested and with much wider composition-to-earliest-copy spans than the New Testament documents, “even two generations are too short a span to allow the mythical tendency to prevail over the hard historic core of the oral tradition” (Sherwin-White, 190).

In the 19th century, Ferdinand Christian Baur (1792–1860), founder of the “Tubingen School” of theology, maintained that the majority of the New Testament documents were pseudonymous works and gave little weight to the evidence of numerous citations provided by the early Christian writers (commonly known as “church fathers”). Proposing that the New Testament documents were written within a frame of perhaps120 years, his suggested dates ranged from ca. 50–60AD for Paul’s genuine letters (i.e., Romans, 1–2 Corinthians, Galatians) to about 170AD for the Gospel and letters of John. Baur’s proposal was remained influential for later attempts to date and identify authorship of the New Testament documents (Harris, 237, 248–62; Ellis, Appendix VI).

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More recent dating proposals have reflected the impact, among both “liberal” and “conservative” scholars, of various lines of evidence which indicate earlier dates for the New Testament documents. For example, the notorious “death-of-God” proponent John A.T. Robinson (1976) contended that all 27 documents were composed prior to 70AD. He proposed a compositional span of approximately 20 years: from about 47–48AD (Galatians) to late 68–70AD (Revelation; Redating, 352). He mainly based his argument on the fact that the New Testament documents do not reference the fall of Jerusalem (70AD; Redating, 13–30).

More recently, influential Roman Catholic scholar Raymond E. Brown (1997) proposed a date range for the New Testament documents that spanned approximately 80 years: from 50–51AD for 1 Thessalonians, to 130AD for 2 Peter – although favoring a first-century date for almost all documents other than 2 Peter and 2 John (Introduction, 396, 457, 762).

Evangelical scholar E. Earle Ellis (1995), reflecting views accepted and espoused by many “conservative” Biblical writers, has proposed that the New Testament documents were the result of four streams of apostolic sources: Peter, James, John, and Paul. He dated all the New Testament documents within the first century: 49AD (for Galatians) to 85–95AD (Gospel of John), with the majority of the documents dated to the 50s and 60s (Making, 319), considering 70AD key for setting the upper limit dating for a majority of the New Testament documents.

Outer Limits – Manuscript Evidence and Quotations in early Christian Writers

The speculative efforts various negative critical scholars to “late-date” various New Testament documents are confronted by some “stubborn facts.” For example, every New Testament book is quoted by the “Apostolic Fathers” (as the early Christian writers down to 150AD are commonly known). Almost every book of the New Testament is explicitly cited as Scripture by these early writers. By around 300, nearly every verse in the New Testament was cited in one or more of over 36,000 citations found in the writings of the Church Fathers (Geisler and Nix 108, 155). The distribution of those writings are important evidence because of their early date, the wide geographic distribution of where these authors lived, where their recipients lived, and the large number of New Testament references

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they contain. Evidence from these early Christian writers is explored in greater detail in other articles in this series, providing external evidence that from the beginning, churches and Christians recognized the authority of the apostolic writings which were soon disseminated and widely known.

Given the amount and early dates of these extensive quotations of the New Testament documents, it is impossible to argue seriously for the sort of “late-dating” and alleged pseudonymous composition of the documents composing the corpus of the New Testament. This stream of evidence is, of course, in addition to the various manuscript copies in Greek (to say nothing of early translations) of the New Testament documents.

Among these are the John Rylands papyri (p52), the earliest undisputed manuscript of a New Testament book, dated from 117 to 138AD. This fragment of John’s Gospel survives from within a generation of composition. Furthermore, inasmuch as the book was composed in Asia Minor while this fragment was found in Egypt, some circulation time is demanded, which surely places the composition of John within the first century. Entire books (Bodmer Papyri) are available from about 200AD. The Chester Beatty Papyri, from 150 years after the New Testament was finished (ca. 250), include all the Gospels and most of the New Testament. It is beyond dispute that no other book from the ancient world has as small a time span between composition and earliest manuscript copies, as does the New Testament.

Indeed, as has often been noted by many who have spent their lives pondering ancient evidence pertaining to the Scripture, “No work from Graeco-Roman antiquity is so well attested by manuscript tradition as the New Testament. There are many more manuscripts of the New Testament than there are of any classical author, and the oldest extensive remains of it date only about two centuries after their original composition” (Albright 1971, 238). Those who would question the integrity of the New Testament texts, by the same token destroy confidence in the integrity of any ancient document which has been handed down through the copying process.

Specific Instances and Particulars

While it is not possible in this short article to include a detailed explication of the date and authorship of every New Testament book, some samples will have to

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suffice for the present. As these articles are expanded and collected for publication in book form, more details may be added to what originally appears here.

Luke and Acts. The Gospel of Luke was written by the same author as the Acts of the Apostles, who refers to Luke as the “former account” of “all that Jesus began to do and teach” (Acts 1:1). The style, vocabulary and recipient (Theophilus) of the two books betray a common author. Roman historian Colin Hemer has provided powerful evidence that Acts was written between 60AD and 62AD. This evidence includes these observations: There is no mention in Acts of the crucial event of the fall of Jerusalem in 70, or of the outbreak of the Jewish War in 66, and no hint of serious deterioration of relations between Romans and Jews before that time, nor of the deterioration of Christian relations with Rome during the Neronian persecution of the late 60s. There is no mention of the death of James at the hands of the Sanhedrin in ca. 62, as recorded by Josephus in Antiquities of the Jews (20.9.1.200). Controversies described in Acts presume that the Temple was still standing; and the relative prominence and authority of the Sadducees in Acts reflects a pre-70 date, before the collapse of their political cooperation with Rome. Likewise, the prominence of “God-fearers” in the synagogues may point to a pre-70 date, after which there were few Gentile inquirers and converts to Judaism. Additionally, the confident “tone” of Acts seems unlikely during the Neronian persecution of Christians and the Jewish War with Rome during the late 60s.

If Acts was written in 62 or before, and the gospel according to Luke was written before Acts (possibly 60AD or even before), then Luke was written only about thirty years after the death of Jesus. This is obviously contemporary to the generation who witnessed the events of Jesus’ life, death, and resurrection – which precisely what Luke claims in the prologue to his Gospel:

Many have undertaken to draw up an account of the things that have been fulfilled among us, just as they were handed down to us by those who from the first were eye-witnesses and servants of the word. Therefore, since I myself have carefully investigated everything from the beginning, it seemed good also to me to write an orderly account for you, most excellent

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Theophilus, so that you may know the certainty of the things you have been taught. [Luke 1:1–4]

While so far considering only Luke of the four gospels (due to Luke’s authorship of Acts as well), it is commonly accepted as factual by the preponderance of those who have examined the evidence in detail – whether “conservative” or “liberal” scholars – that other gospels, particularly Mark, were committed to writing even earlier. In all such deliberations, it is good to remember that, for believers, there is in reality one gospel, recalled and recorded by four different evangelists (“according to Matthew” etc.) as each was empowered by the Spirit to remember and reveal what God wishes for us to know, expressed as the Spirit moved them to do so.

First Corinthians. It is widely accepted by many “critical” and “conservative” scholars alike that 1 Corinthians was written by 55 or 56 – less than a quarter century after the crucifixion. Further, Paul speaks of most of a collection of 500 eyewitnesses to the resurrection who were still alive when he wrote (15:6) – including the apostles and James the brother of Jesus. Internal evidence is strong for this early date: the book repeatedly claims to be written by Paul (1:1, 12–17; 3:4, 6, 22; 16:21); there are significant parallels with the book of Acts; the contents harmonize with what has been learned about Corinth during that era.

There also is external evidence: Clement of Rome refers to it in his own Epistle to the Corinthians (chap. 47), as does The Epistle of Barnabas (allusion, chapter 4) and the Shepherd of Hermas (chapter 4). Furthermore, there are nearly 600 quotations of 1 Corinthians in Irenaeus, Clement of Alexandria, and Tertullian alone. It is one of the best attested books of any kind from the ancient world.

2 Corinthians and Galatians, along with 1 Corinthians, are well attested and early. All three reveal a historical interest in the events of Jesus’ life and give facts that agree with the Gospels. Paul speaks of Jesus’ virgin birth (Gal. 4:4), sinless life (2 Cor. 5:21), death on the cross (1 Cor. 15:3; Gal. 3:13); resurrection on the third day (1 Cor. 15:4), and post-resurrection appearances (1 Cor. 15:5–8). He mentions the hundreds of eyewitnesses who could verify the resurrection (1 Cor. 15:6), grounding the truth of Christianity on the historicity of the resurrection (1 Cor. 15:12–19). Paul also gives historical details about Jesus’

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contemporaries, the apostles (1 Cor. 15:5–8), including his private encounters with Peter and the apostles (Gal. 1:18–2:14). Persons, places, and events relating to Christ’s birth are described as historical. Luke goes to great pains to note that Jesus was born during the days of Caesar Augustus (Luke 2:1) and was baptized in the fifteenth year of Tiberius. Pontius Pilate was governor of Judea and Herod was tetrarch of Galilee. Annas and Caiaphas were high priests (Luke 3:1–2).

New Testament authors write with a clear sense of historical perspective (see Gal 4:4; Heb 1:1–2). They wrote against the historical backdrop of a Mediterranean world immersed in Greco-Roman culture and ruled by Rome and Roman officials known from non-Biblical sources (though those sources are significantly less-well attested than the New Testament documents. While the authors of the New Testament documents do include important figures, places, and events, they do not demonstrate an interest in precise chronological detail. As a result, many of their references to historical realities were more of an incidental nature. And, as is common in historical writing, they use various sources, make various choices about what evidence to incorporate or omit, and arrange their evidence to tell the story they wish to record. That is what historians do, after all.

Antilegomena: Disputed Documents

The basic principle of whether a document was recognized as legitimately belonging to the New Covenant scriptures was its apostolic “pedigree” – was it of apostolic (or prophetic) origin, and thus revelation from God? Because of some questions about the authorship or apostolic origin of seven documents (Hebrews, James, 2 Peter, 2-3 John, Jude, and Revelation) were sometimes challenged by various early Christians. Sometime referred to as antilegomena (“spoken against”), the very challenges these documents faced demonstrate ever more strongly that the ultimately test for whether these documents were recognized as divine revelation was: are they apostolic? Since Hebrews and 2-3 John are without authorial attribution, it is quite understandable that some might at first question their apostolic origin. Given the early martyrdom of James, the brother of John, understandable questions arose regarding the authorship of the epistle of James. The Apocalypse (Revelation) came under question later due to its wide usage by numerous heretics.

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Even 2 Peter, the most contested of the New Testament epistles, provides a benchmark of sorts for the standards necessary for a document to be recognized as the word of God. 2 Peter was questioned due to stylistic and vocabulary differences (it has the largest number of hapax legomena or unique words of any New Testament document) as well as parallels with the epistle of Jude. But as E.M.B Green points out, arguing on the basis of Westcott’s work, 2 Peter “has incomparably better support for its inclusion than the best attested of the rejected books” (p.5). Kostenberger and Kruger (73, 153-155) challenge modern examples of early and later documents unfairly grouped together, as though both are of equally legitimacy, by modern authors with their own agendas.

Kruger (645), among other conservative scholars, challenges the common notion that 2 Peter is non-apostolic, contending that “the case for its pseudonymity is simply too incomplete and insufficient to warrant the dogmatic conclusions issued by much of modern scholarship. Although 2 Peter has various difficulties that are still being explored, we have no reason to doubt the epistle’s own claims in regard to authorship.” A good discussion of many of these disputations is in Harrison (416-428).

Conclusion

Jesus Christ himself is obviously the center and circumference of the New Testament documents which record his life and works. The gospels present themselves to readers as calm and rational expositors of historical facts. Nearly all we know about Jesus comes from these source materials, written by those who had personal knowledge of the events they describe or their sources who had such firsthand, eyewitness knowledge. They record the claims of Jesus, but also indicate that he intended for this knowledge to be disseminated not by himself, but rather by men he selected and approved to carry his message to the world (John 16:13-14, 20:21-23; Matthew 10:20, 16:19, 18:18; Luke 22:30. That these appointed messengers did so effectively is attested by the widespread documentation, within a generation or two of the events themselves, of that proclamation, written down for succeeding generations to read and receive with confidence in their accuracy and veracity.

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Sources:

Albright, William F., From the Stone Age to Christianity (2nd ed; New York: Anchor Books, 1957).

__________. The Archaeology of Palestine. Reprint; Gloucester MA: Peter Smith, 1971.

__________. “Toward a More Conservative View.” Christianity Today, January 18, 1963, p.4.

Brown, Raymond E. An Introduction to the New Testament. New York: Doubleday, 1997.

Bruce, F.F., J.I Packer, Philip Comfort, and Carl F.H. Henry, eds. The Origin of the Bible. Carol Stream, IL: Tyndale House, 2003.

Carson, D.A., and Douglas Moo. An Introduction to the New Testament. 2nd ed. Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 2005.

Ellis, E Earle. The Making of the New Testament Documents. Leiden: Brill, 1999.

Geisler, Norman L., and William E. Nix, From God To Us Revised and Expanded: How We Got Our Bible. 2nd ed.; Chicago: Moody Press, 2012.

Green, E.M.B. 2 Peter Reconsidered. London: Tyndale, 1961.

Harris, Horton. The Tübingen School: A Historical and Theological Investigation of the School of F.C. Baur. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975.

Harrison, Everett F., Introduction to the New Testament. Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 1971.

Hemer, Colin J. The Book of Acts in the Setting of Hellenistic History. Ed. Conrad H. Gempf. Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 1990.

Kostenberger, Andreas J., and Michael J. Kruger. The Heresy of Orthodoxy. Wheaton, IL: Crossway, 2010.

Kruger, Michael J. “The Authenticity of 2 Peter,” Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society 42.4 (1999), 645-671.

Longenecker, Richard N. “On the Form, Function, and Authority of the New Testament Letters.” In D.A. Carson and John D. Woodbridge, Scripture and Truth. Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 1983, 101-114.

Robinson, John A.T. Redating the New Testament. Philadelphia: Westminster, 1976.

Sherwin-White, Adrian Nicholas. Roman Society and Roman Law in the New Testament. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963.

Wells, H.G. The Outline of History (Garden City, NY: Garden City Publishing, 1921).

Nostalgia: Handle With Care – WordPoints

Nostalgia: Handle With Care – WordPoints

Nostalgia: Handle with Care

“Do not say, ‘Why were the former days better than these?’ For you do not inquire wisely concerning this” (Ecclesiastes 7:10).

IT’S HARD TO REACH FORWARD AND BACKWARD AT THE SAME TIME. Yet I fear that’s the very thing we often try to do. We say we’re reaching forward, but the pull of nostalgia can tug at our hearts so strongly that we catch ourselves trying to make the world like it USED to be rather than the way it OUGHT to be, as if “used to be” and “ought to be” were exactly synonymous. The net effect of our exertions in life is often more backward than forward.

Nostalgia is a wonderful thing, and not many folks love it any more than I do. But nostalgia must be handled with care. If we don’t watch out, it can hinder us in our journey toward God. So here are a few tips on enjoying the past in a helpful, healthful way.

(1) WHATEVER GOOD MAY HAVE BEEN DONE PREVIOUSLY, TODAY IS THE ONLY DAY ANY NEW ACTIVITY CAN BE DONE. We can enjoy the past, and we can certainly learn from it. But yesterday’s work is already done, and that work won’t suffice for today. Thinking about the past (or anything else, for that matter) can’t be a substitute for today’s action.

(2) WE MUST LEARN TO BE GRATEFUL FOR THE PAST WITHOUT WORSHIPING IT. Having the right attitude toward past, present, and future is a matter of BALANCE. If there are good things about the days gone by, we must love those things neither too little nor too much. Maintaining that balance requires making frequent adjustments.

(3) EVEN IF THE PAST WAS BETTER THAN THE PRESENT IN SOME WAYS, IT IS FRUITLESS TO WONDER WHY. None of us — not even the philosophers — have enough information to answer the question, “Why is the world changing as it is?” The farmer must stick to seed-sowing and not worry too much why the weather’s not what it used to be.

When we get to wondering “Why were the former days better than these?” we need to understand that THE PAST WASN’T REALLY AS WONDERFUL AS WE REMEMBER IT. After all, our memories are quite selective, remembering a few pleasant things and forgetting others that weren’t so pleasant. So while the good old days may do our hearts good to ponder, they don’t serve very well as a goal for the future.

“Through the centuries the people have dreamed of a Golden Age and longed for its return, unconscious that they dream of a day that has never been” (Guy E. Shipler).

Gary Henry – WordPoints.com

Recent Addendum to “Innocent Man” – Texas Monthly

Recent Addendum to “Innocent Man” – Texas Monthly

Judge: Prosecutor in Morton Case Deliberately Concealed Evidence

ARREST WARRANT IS ISSUED FOR FORMER WILLIAMSON COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY KEN ANDERSON, THE MAN WHO PROSECUTED MICHAEL MORTON AND HELPED PUT HIM IN PRISON FOR NEARLY 25 YEARS FOR A CRIME HE DIDN’T COMMIT.
by PAMELA COLLOFF  —  FRI APRIL 19, 2013 2:15 PM
Surrounded by his five attorneys, Judge Ken Anderson leaves the court of inquiry after Judge Louis Sturns issued a warrant for his arrest on April 19.
Bob Daemmrich

This afternoon, Michael Morton received a long-awaited measure of justice when the inquiry into alleged misconduct in the 1987 trial that resulted in his wrongful conviction ended with a stinging rebuke to the man who prosecuted him. State district Judge Louis Sturns, who presided over the court of inquiry, ruled that Ken Anderson—the former D.A. of Williamson County who prosecuted Michael—should face criminal charges for his conduct. Though Anderson has denied any wrongdoing, Sturns found that Anderson lied when he assured the trial judge that he had no evidence in his possession that was favorable to the accused. This was a deliberate “concealment of evidence,” Sturns said, which was “intended to defraud the court” and win a conviction. Sturns stated his belief that Anderson committed a felony by doing so.

In the end, Sturns found that Anderson committed criminal contempt of court, and he issued a warrant for an arrest. Anderson—a sitting district judge—left the courtroom with his lawyers, walking past the courtroom where he currently presides, to be booked into the Williamson County jail. (He will be released this afternoon on $2,500 bond.) The case will now be referred to a grand jury, which can issue an indictment. Anderson, who faces reelection next year, could face jail time if he is found guilty.

As long as 26 years ago, Michael’s lead trial attorney, Bill Allison, suspected that Anderson had not turned over all of the investigators’ reports in the case to the defense. As I wrote in the second half of my two-part series on the case, Anderson and Allison had repeatedly battled over this issue:

During two pretrial hearings, the lawyers had clashed over what evidence the state should, or should not, have to turn over. As Allison remembered it, state district judge William Lott had ordered Anderson to provide him with all of Wood’s reports and notes before the trial so he could determine whether they contained any “Brady material.” (The term refers to the landmark 1963 U.S. Supreme Court ruling in Brady v. Maryland, which holds that prosecutors are required to turn over any evidence that is favorable to the accused. Failure to do so is considered to be a “Brady violation,” or a breach of a defendant’s constitutional right to due process.)

Judge Lott had examined everything Anderson had given him and ruled that no Brady material was present. Afterward, as is the protocol in such a situation, the judge had placed the papers in a sealed file that could be opened only by the appellate courts to review at a later date. Thinking back on that series of events, Allison had a terrible thought: What if Anderson had not, in fact, given Lott all of [Sgt. Don] Wood’s reports and notes?

Allison’s suspicion was based on two peculiarities of the trial. First, Anderson had not called Wood to the stand to testify. This was highly unusual, given that Wood was the case’s lead investigator. Allison had also overheard a conversation at the end of the trial, which I described in the first half of my Morton story, when he lingered in the courtroom after the verdict was read:

Both he and prosecutor Mike Davis, who had assisted Anderson during the trial, stayed behind to ask the jurors about their views of the case. It was during their discussions in the jury room that Allison says he overheard Davis make an astonishing statement, telling several jurors that if Michael’s attorneys had been able to obtain Wood’s reports, they could have raised more doubt than they did. (Davis has said under oath that he has no recollection of making such a statement.) What, Allison wondered, was in Wood’s reports?

In fact, many details in Wood’s reports supported the idea that Christine Morton had been killed by an unknown intruder. The most significant document that the defense never saw was an eight-page transcript of a phone call that had taken place between Wood and Christine’s mother, Rita Kirkpatrick, less than two weeks after Christine’s murder. During this phone conversation, Kirkpatrick told Wood that the Mortons’ three-year-old son, Eric—who was home at the time of the murder—had reported seeing a “monster” kill his mother. He also said that his father had not been home when the crime occurred. Many of the details that Eric gave to his grandmother—such as the fact that the perpetrator threw a blue suitcase on the bed after he killed Christine—dovetailed perfectly with the crime scene.

That a former D.A.—much less a sitting district judge—will be held to account for alleged prosecutorial misconduct is extraordinarily unusual, if not unprecedented. Now, based on Judge Sturns’s ruling, Anderson is being held accountable for the decisions he made more than a quarter-century ago which sent Michael to prison for a crime he did not commit.

Read This. You will want to read Part 2.

Read This. You will want to read Part 2.

The Innocent Man, Part One

ON AUGUST 13, 1986, MICHAEL MORTON CAME HOME FROM WORK TO DISCOVER THAT HIS WIFE HAD BEEN BRUTALLY MURDERED IN THEIR BED. HIS NIGHTMARE HAD ONLY BEGUN.
Photograph by Williamson County Sun

Editors’ note: This is part one of a two-part story. The second half can be found here.

Editors’ note: This is the second part of a two-part story.

The first half was published in the November issue and can be read here.

The Delete Squad: Free Speech on the Internet (New Republic)

The Delete Squad: Free Speech on the Internet (New Republic)

The Delete Squad: Google, Twitter, Facebook and the new global battle over the future of free speech

BY JEFFREY ROSEN  — New Republic — April 29, 2013

A year ago this month, Stanford Law School hosted a little-noticed meeting that may help decide the future of free speech online. It took place in the faculty lounge, where participants were sustained in their deliberations by bagels and fruit platters. Among the roughly two-dozen attendees, the most important were a group of fresh-faced tech executives, some of them in t-shirts and unusual footwear, who are in charge of their companies’ content policies. Their positions give these young people more power over who gets heard around the globe than any politician or bureaucrat—more power, in fact, than any president or judge.

Collectively, the tech leaders assembled that day in Palo Alto might be called “the Deciders,” in a tribute to Nicole Wong, the legal director of Twitter, whose former colleagues affectionately bestowed on her the singular version of that nickname while she was deputy general counsel at Google. At the dawn of the Internet age, some of the nascent industry’s biggest players staked out an ardently hands-off position on hate speech; Wong was part of the generation that discovered firsthand how untenable this extreme libertarian position was. In one representative incident, she clashed with the Turkish government over its demands that YouTube take down videos posted by Greek soccer fans claiming that Kemal Ataturk was gay. Wong and her colleagues at Google agreed to block access to the clips in Turkey, where insulting the country’s founder is illegal, but Turkish authorities—who insisted on a worldwide ban—responded by denying their citizens access to the whole site for two years. “I’m taking my best guess at what will allow our products to move forward in a country,” she told me in 2008. The other Deciders, who don’t always have Wong’s legal training, have had to make their own guesses, each with ramifications for their company’s bottom line.

The session at Stanford concluded with the attendees passing a resolution for the formation of an “Anti-Cyberhate Working Group,” then heading over to Facebook’s headquarters to drink white wine out of plastic cups at a festive reception. But despite the generally laid-back vibe, the meeting, part of a series of discussions dating back more than a year, had a serious agenda. Because of my work on the First Amendment, I was asked to join the conversations, along with other academics, civil libertarians, and policymakers from the United States and abroad. Although I can’t identify all the participants by name, I am at liberty, according to the ground rules of our meetings, to describe the general thrust of the discussions, which are bringing together the Deciders at a pivotal time.

As online communication proliferates—and the ethical and financial costs of misjudgments rise—the Internet giants are grappling with the challenge of enforcing their community guidelines for free speech. Some Deciders see a solution in limiting the nuance involved in their protocols, so that only truly dangerous content is removed from circulation. But other parties have very different ideas about what’s best for the Web. Increasingly, some of the Deciders have become convinced that the greatest threats to free speech during the next decade will come not just from authoritarian countries like China, Russia, and Iran, who practice political censorship and have been pushing the United Nations to empower more of it, but also from a less obvious place: European democracies contemplating broad new laws that would require Internet companies to remove posts that offend the dignity of an individual, group, or religion. The Deciders are right to be concerned about the balkanization of the Internet. There is, moreover, a bold way to respond to that threat. The urgent question is whether the Deciders will embrace it.

At Facebook, the deciders are led by Dave Willner, the head of the company’s content policy team. His career provides a kind of case study in how the Deciders’ thinking has evolved. Now 28, Willner joined Facebook five years ago, working night shifts in the help center, where he answered e-mails from users about how to use the photo uploader. Within a year, he had been promoted to work on content policy. Today, he manages a crew of six employees who work around shared desks at Facebook’s headquarters in Menlo Park; rather than a global hub for content control, their space, festooned with colorful posters, more closely resembles a neater-than-usual college dorm. Toiling under Willner’s team are a few hundred “first responders” who review complaints about nudity, porn, violence, and hate speech from offices in Menlo Park, Austin, Dublin, and Hyderabad, India. (Willner is also married to a fellow Facebook employee who now leads the User Safety team, responsible, among other things, for child protection and suicide prevention; one imagines rather heady dinner chatter.) Facebook had only 100 million users when Willner was hired, compared with the billion-plus it has now. Each day, they upload more than 300 million photos alone; every week, Facebook receives more than two million requests to remove material. (The New Republic’s owner was a Facebook co-founder.)

When I first met Willner at the Stanford meeting, he wore an orange T-shirt, a gray striped sweater, blue corduroy trousers, round glasses, and a bookish beard—looking very much like the former anthropology and archeology major that he was before starting at Facebook. He took a class about Islam in his senior year, which he says comes in handy in his current job. At the time Willner joined Facebook’s content policy team, the company had no rules on the books for what speech violated its terms of service. So Willner decided to write them himself. He chose as his model university anti-harassment codes, since he himself had just graduated from college. But he soon found that vague standards prohibiting speech that creates a “hostile environment” weren’t practical. The Facebook screeners scattered across three continents brought vastly different cultural backgrounds to their roles and had to rule on thousands of pieces of content daily. The sheer range and complexity of the judgment calls that had to be made compounded the challenge: Is this person naked? Is a photo of Hitler racism, or political commentary? Is it bullying to post a photo of someone distorted through Photoshop? Is posting a photo of a gun a credible threat of violence? What if the gun is from the cover of a rap album?

Willner had read John Stuart Mill in college and understood the crowning achievement of the American First Amendment tradition, which allows speech to be banned only when it is intended—and likely—to incite imminent violence or lawless action. By contrast, as Willner was learning, European law draws a tighter line, prohibiting so-called group libel, or speech that offends the dignity of members of a protected class and lowers their standing in society. Willner decided that neither method would do: Both the U.S. focus on the speaker’s intent and the European focus on the social consequences of their speech would be too subjective for a 22-year-old content reviewer in Dublin or Hyderabad to apply in 20 seconds.What Facebook needed, he came to believe, was a hate-speech policy that focused on concrete, easily categorized actions, so that the decision to remove controversial content, or to escalate the dispute to Willner and his colleagues in Silicon Valley, could be based on nothing more than the information contained within the form that Facebook users file to complain about offensive posts and applied like an algorithm. He sought an engineer’s response to a thorny historical and legal problem—a very Silicon Valley approach.

At first, it didn’t go well. To try to spell out what qualified as a hateful post, Facebook hired an outside firm to write an “Operations Manual for Live Content Moderators,” which was subsequently leaked. Some of the distinctions made by the document were ridiculed by the blogosphere for being jesuitical: “Blatant (obvious) depictions of camel toes and moose knuckles” were banned in the “sex and nudity category,” while the graphic content category held that “bodily fluids (except semen) are ok to show unless a human being is captured in the process.”Furthermore, the draft standards seemed to ban all “Holocaust denial which focuses on hate speech” and “all attacks on Ataturk (visual and text)” around the world, even though Holocaust denial is illegal only in certain countries, including France and Germany, and attacking Ataturk is outlawed only in Turkey. In response to the uproar, Facebook fired the consulting company, and Willner redoubled his efforts to minimize the opportunities for subjective verdicts by his first responders.

Eventually, the project led to Facebook’s most important free-speech decision: to ban attacks on groups, but not on institutions. The current community standards declare: “We do not permit individuals … to attack others based on their race, ethnicity, national origin, religion, sex, gender, sexual orientation, disability or medical condition.” But Facebook allows caricatures that depict members of protected groups doing unflattering things, as well as attacks on their faith or leaders. It’s only when a user categorically reviles a protected group that he crosses the line: “I hate Islam” or “I hate the Pope” is fine; “I hate Muslims” or “I hate Catholics” is not. The distinctions might be seen as a triumph of reductionism. But they have empowered the company to resist growing calls for the wholesale deletion ofspeech that foreign governments and their citizens consider blasphemous.

Facebook’s new policy was dramatically tested last September, when the company refused to remove Innocence of the Muslims, the anti-Muhammad video that was initially blamed for causing the Benghazi riots that led to the death of the American ambassador to Libya. After watching the video, Willner and his colleagues concluded that, because nobody said anything explicitly denigrating of Muslims, there was nothing to ban.

As the world watched footage of the body of Christopher Stevens being dragged through the streets, YouTube reached a similar decision. Despite allegations that the riots had been caused by an Arabic-language version of the video posted on the site, it turned out that an English version of Innocence of the Muslims had been in circulation since July. YouTube had determined that the clip didn’t violate its terms of service, which by then were similar to Facebook’s: “Sometimes there is a fine line between what is and what is not considered hate speech. For instance, it is generally okay to criticize a nation, but not okay to make insulting generalizations about people of a particular nationality.” As the violence spread from Libya to Egypt, YouTube temporarily restricted access in those two nations, because of the confusion on the ground. But the company refused to delete the video around the world, even as Egyptian leader Mohamed Morsi, speaking at the United Nations, called on YouTube to do just that.

In a separate U.N. speech, invoking the American free-speech tradition, President Barack Obama rejected Morsi’s idea that the video could be banned simply because it was blasphemous: The First Amendment, he suggested, prohibits the government from taking sides in religious disputes. Instead, in the name of protecting U.S. foreign policy interests, the Obama administration asked YouTube to reconsider its conclusion that the video didn’t violate the company’s terms of service. By exerting this subtle pressure, Obama came close to a version of the heckler’s veto, urging for the film’s removal because of its potential to provoke riots. U.S. courts, despite Obama’s demands, discourage the government from suppressing speech because of its likely effect on an angry mob; judges generally require the authorities to control the audience, not muzzle the speaker. In this case, of course, the mobs fell well outside of U.S. jurisdiction, and the link between the video and potential violence also wasn’t clear. In fact, subsequent investigation called into question the claims of causality that had seemed obvious early on.

Like Facebook, Google and YouTube were right to focus on the content of the film, and right to conclude that, unless the incitement to violence was obvious—say, in the form of a tagline reading, “RISE UP IN VIOLENCE AGAINST MUSLIMS”—the Innocencevideo should remain as widely available as possible. Had YouTube made a different decision, links to the video from the many news stories that mentioned it would have been disabled, denying millions of viewers across the globe access to a newsworthy story and the chance to form their own opinions. In the heat of the moment, both the White House and the content teams at Facebook and YouTube had to make judgments about the same inflammatory material. From a free-speech perspective, the young Deciders made better decisions than the president of the United States.

The meetings that the deciders have been holding at Stanford and elsewhere trace their origins to an earlier gathering half a world away. It was convened in 2011 by the Task Force on Internet Hate of the Inter-parliamentary Coalition for Combating Antisemitism, an initiative with an unwieldy name but a crucial mission: to try to get European parliamentarians and law-enforcement officials to work together with American civil libertarians, the Anti-Defamation League, and the leading Internet companies in shaping standards for online expression. The venue was the Houses of Parliament in London, in a paneled room near the top of the Big Ben clock tower.

After some spirited discussion, the group trooped down a winding stone staircase to the visitors’ gallery overlooking the House of Commons, from which the task force watched our chairman, Member of Parliament John Mann, deliver a blistering summary of his position on the regulation of online speech. “Freedom of expression is not always a good thing,” he told his colleagues in the House. “The Internet is now the place where anti-Semitic filth is spread.”

Because of its historical experience with fascism and communism, Europe sees the suppression of hate speech as a way of promoting democracy. Paradoxically, it has increasingly begun to pursue this goal by legislative and judicial fiat. More than 20 European countries have signed a protocol on cyber-crime that calls on member nations to expand the existing criminal penalties for “acts of a racist and xenophobic nature committed through computer systems.” The Council of Europe has also pushed for increased hate-speech regulation. It’s because of moves like those that some Deciders are worried, as one of them put it, that “we may end up in a situation where Europe slides into a situation currently occupied by Turkey, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and India”—countries in which claims of offensiveness can be deployed as a tool of oppression.

Dave Willner (far right above) consults with some of his troops at Facebook HQ. When necessary, the team blocks local access to content that runs afoul of foreign laws, while keeping it available to the rest of the world, as it did with these images and videos.

A recent book, The Harm in Hate Speech, vividly confirms the Deciders’ fears. It was written by Jeremy Waldron, a New York University and Oxford professor who is a vocal champion of the European approach and its most prominent defender for American audiences. Waldron is best known for his longstanding opposition to judicial review: He believes that legislatures, rather than courts, should take the lead in formulating public policy. But this faith in the power of legislation to protect fundamental rights makes him naively optimistic about the capacity of legislatures (rather than Deciders) to balance the competing values of dignity, privacy, and free speech. He notes, accurately, that the U.S. is a global outlier in not regulating group libel and sympathetically invokes laws in countries like the United Kingdom, Germany, and France that prohibit expressions of racial and religious hatred even when there’s no immediate prospect that they will provoke violence. He maintains that hate speech creates what he calls “an environmental threat to social peace.”

Waldron’s argument has a remarkable blind spot: It virtually ignores the Internet. He begins his book by imagining a Muslim man walking with his two young daughters on a city street in New Jersey, where they are confronted with an anti-Muslim sign. Waldron believes that allowing these posters on street corners will convince members of vulnerable minorities “that they are not accepted as ordinary good-faith participants in social life.” But like the European regulators who share his views, Waldron seems unaware that the most significant free-speech debates today don’t take place on street corners, or lampposts, or sandwich boards. They take place online, where a person’s social networks and RSS feeds can filter out many unwelcome views—but where the risks that overregulation will open the door to suppression of political expression are exponentially higher than in the offline world. The secret police can’t eavesdrop on every whisper of revolution. Armed with a Great Firewall, on the other hand, repressive governments can block entire categories of information.

And they’re determined to do so. At a December meeting in Dubai, for example, a majority of the 193 countries that make up the U.N.’s International Telecommunication Union approved a proposal by China, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan to create ominous “international norms and rules standardizing behavior of countries concerning information and cyberspace,” as a description of the measure provided by the Chinese government puts it. Waldron, who endorses an earlier U.N. resolution condemning religious defamation while emphasizing the need to protect ideological dissent, would of course never go that far. But the thing about slippery slopes is that, in practice, they can prove hard to avoid. The Dubai meeting highlights the danger of addressing hate speech on the borderless Internet by expanding international regulation: It may be authoritarian dictatorships, not enlightened democracies, who end up writing the new rules.

Waldron offers a defense of free-speech regulation for the nineteenth or early twentieth centuries that threatens the openness of the Internet in the twenty-first. He can’t clearly tell us, for example, whether his definition of hate speech would permit or ban the anti-Muhammad cartoons that Facebook refused to take down after they were first published by a Danish newspaper in 2010. Here is his torturous analysis: “In and of themselves, the cartoons can be regarded as a critique of Islam rather than a libel on Muslim; they contribute, in their twisted way, to a debate about the connection between the prophet’s teaching and the more violent aspects of modern jihadism.” But, he adds, “They would come close to a libel on Muslims if they were calculated to suggest that most followers of Islam support political and religious violence.” He then offers this hedging conclusion: “So it might be a question of judgment whether this was an attack on Danish Muslims as well as an attack on Muhammad. But it was probably appropriate for Denmark’s Director of Public Prosecutions not to initiate legal action against the newspaper.” That byzantine verdict, offered after the fact, is all very well for Denmark’s Director of Public Prosecutions, but Waldron’s opaque standard would be impossible for an Internet first responder to apply in a matter of seconds. And Web companies have another, better reasonfor rejecting European-style prohibitions on group libel, with their complicated calculations about the social consequences of hate speech: Even if they could be applied by Internet screeners, they would open the door to vast subjectivity and to a less open world.

The deciders, of course, have blind spots of their own. Their hate-speech policies tend to reflect a bias toward the civility norms of U.S. workplaces; they identify speech that might get you fired if you said them at your job, but which would be legal if shouted at a rally, and try to banish that expression from the entire Internet. But given their tremendous size and importance as platforms for free speech, companies like Facebook, Google, Yahoo, and Twitter shouldn’t try to be guardians of what Waldron calls a “well-ordered society”; instead, they should consider themselves the modern version of Oliver Wendell Holmes’s fractious marketplace of ideas—democratic spaces where all values, including civility norms, are always open for debate.

Some of the Deciders understand this. At a hate-speech panel in Houston in November, Jud Hoffman, Facebook’s global policy manager, told the audience that his company was tightening its policies, introducing a new system for identifying speech likely to provoke violence. Rather than examining the context in which speech arises, Hoffman said the company now looks for evidence of four objective standards to determine whether a threat is credible: time, place, method, and target. If three of the four criteria are satisfied, the company removes the post or video. This refined approach, Hoffman stressed, helps to protect users against the heckler’s veto, preventing speech from being based on the predicted reaction of the audience. It also avoids Waldron’s murky inquiries into the effect of speech on a group’s social status.

The company that has moved the furthest toward the American free-speech ideal is Twitter, which has explicitly concluded that it wants to be a platform for democracy rather than civility. Unlike Google and Facebook, it doesn’t ban hate speech at all; instead, it prohibits only “direct, specific threats of violence against others.” Last year, after the French government objected to the hash tag “#unbonjuif”—intended to inspire hateful riffs on the theme “a good Jew …”—Twitter blocked a handful of the resulting tweets in France, but only because they violated French law. Within days, the bulk of the tweets carrying the hash tag had turned from anti-Semitic to denunciations of anti-Semitism, confirming that the Twittersphere is perfectly capable of dealing with hate speech on its own, without heavy-handed intervention.

As corporate rather than government actors, the Deciders aren’t formally bound by the First Amendment. But to protect the best qualities of the Internet, they need to summon the First Amendment principle that the only speech that can be banned is that which threatens to provoke imminent violence, an ideal articulated by Justice Louis Brandeis in 1927. It’s time, in other words, for some American free-speech imperialism if the Web is to remain open and free in twenty-first century.

As it happens, the big Internet companies have a commercial incentive to pursue precisely that mission. Unless Google, Facebook, Twitter, and other Internet giants draw a hard line on free speech, they will find it more difficult to resist European efforts to transform them from neutral platforms to censors-in-chief for the entire globe. Along with tougher rules on hate speech, the European regulators are weighing a sweeping new privacy right called “the right to be forgotten.” If adopted, it would allow users to demand the deletion from the Internet of photos they’ve posted themselves but come to regret—as well as photos of them that have been widely shared by others and even truthful but embarrassing blog comments others have posted about them. The onus would be on Google or Facebook or Yahoo or Twitter to take down the material as soon as a user makes the request or make the bet that a European privacy commissioner—to whom requests could be appealed—would determine that keeping the material online serves the public interest or provides journalistic, literary, or scientific value. If the companies guess wrong, they could be liable in each case for up to 2 percent of their annual incomes. A European Commission press officer stresses that each member country would choose how to implement the penalties, but for Google, the fines could hit $1 billion per incident.

Invoking a version of the right to be forgotten, an Argentinian judge in 2009 ordered Yahoo to remove racy pictures of Argentinian pop star Virginia da Cunha that were leading users to pornographic sites when they searched for her name. Claiming it was too technologically difficult to remove only the photos, Yahoo removed all references to her on its Argentine servers, so that, if you plug “da Cunha” into the Yahoo Argentina search engine now, you get a blank page and a judicial order. While Yahoo eventually won on appeal, the big Internet companies don’t want to host blank pages—their business models depend on their ability to ease the free exchange of information. But the right to be forgotten, if put in place, could turn them into the equivalent of TV stations with weak signals, resulting in shows that forever flicker in and out. The Deciders would bolster their position in the fight if their own guidelines more strictly limited the kind of speech they will voluntarily delete.

When I spoke with Nicole Wong at Google five years ago, she seemed a little uneasy with the magnitude of the responsibility she had taken on. “I think the Decider model is inconsistent,” she said. “The Internet is big, and Google isn’t the only one making these decisions.” The recent meetings, though not intended to produce a single hate-speech standard, seem to have bolstered the Deciders’ belief in the necessity of embracing the challenges of their unique positions and, perhaps in some cases, how much they relish the work. “I think this is probably what a lot of people who go to law school want to do,” Willner told me. “And I ended up doing it by accident.”

Meanwhile, the quest for the perfect screening system continues. Some of the Internet companies are exploring the possibility of a deploying an algorithm that could predict whether a given piece of content is likely to cause violence in a particular region, based on patterns of violence in the past. But hoping that the machines will one day police themselves amounts to wishful thinking. It may be that U.S. constitutional standards, applied by fickle humans, are the best way of preserving an open Internet.

Lincoln: Dark Lord of the Sith?

Lincoln: Dark Lord of the Sith?

Defending Lincoln against Misguided Libertarians

By  — May 2, 2013

I’m usually pretty open to the kind of work that the libertarian Mises Institute puts out (and I strongly recommend the pdfs of classic books by famous Austrian economists that they make available for free). But yesterday, I stumbled across an article featured on their homepage that struck me as truly outrageous and draws attention to the dangerous contradictions within radical libertarianism.

Professor Thomas DiLorenzo, who will apparently be offering an onlineMises Academy course titled “Lincoln: Founding Father of the American Leviathan State” later this spring, argues that Lincoln misunderstood the Declaration of Independence and is largely responsible for our obsession with revolutions on behalf of equality. DiLorenzo favorably cites an essay by Mel Bradford, who blames Lincoln for America’s more interventionist foreign policy after 1861 and takes issue with Lincoln’s “rhetoric for continuing revolution.”

As DiLorenzo explains:

Professor Bradford was referring to the way in which Lincoln used the “all men are created equal” phrase from the Declaration and reinterpreted it to have meant that it was somehow the duty of Americans to stamp out all sin in the world, wherever it may be found, so that ALL MEN EVERYWHERE could supposedly share in equal freedom. Hence the “rhetoric of continuing revolution” is a rhetorical recipe for perpetual war for perpetual “freedom” everywhere in the world.” It was cemented into place as the new cornerstone of American policy thanks to the deification of Lincoln after his death, which in turn led to the virtual deification of the presidency, and of government in general. The modern-day rhetoric of “American exceptionalism” is just the latest expression of Lincoln’s rhetoric of continuing revolution.

No, using the language of the Declaration does not necessitate stamping out all sin in the world. Indeed, using politics on behalf of a perfectionist worldview is deeply contrary to the conservative interpretation of human nature. We, like many moderate libertarians and classical liberals, believe that mankind is fallen and imperfect and that political mechanisms should be put in place to restrict leaders whose natural impulse is to amass more power. We pursue government by and for the people because the history of man shows that ordered liberty tends to be the best model for good governance and morals. The Civil War wasn’t waged to eradicate all sin. Just one specific sin that was utterly contrary to the Declaration and Constitution—namely, slavery.

Now, on one hand, I can see where DiLorenzo is coming from when he criticizes American neoconservatives who have manipulated the language of Lincoln on behalf of “spreading democracy” across the globe or some other Wilsonian vision that gets us into military trouble. On the other hand, that’s hardly Lincoln’s fault.

I would make the case that the rise of American military intervention after the Civil War was the product of American industrialization and, if anything, Progressive rhetoric by later presidents like Woodrow Wilson and Teddy Roosevelt. Blaming Lincoln for these later historical developments is rather preposterous, since, unlike subsequent progressive leaders, Lincoln took America’s founding documents quite seriously.

The Gettysburg Address is not, as DiLorenzo characterizes it, a rallying cry for ongoing revolution. Anyone who has studied an ounce of 19thcentury American history knows how deeply conflicted Lincoln was about the Civil War. Lincoln rightly justified the War not because he secretly harbored a revolutionary zeal but because America needed to return to the ideals of the Founding and “to the unfinished work which they who fought here have thus far so nobly advanced.”

Lincoln was not appropriating the Declaration for his own purposes. On the contrary, he was reminding his fellow Americans of the principles on which the United States was founded and arguing that slavery was incompatible with those guiding principles. Both the Declaration and Gettysburg Address were aimed at the same audience: Americans who care about their shared and unique history, respect ordered liberty, and wish to uphold those values.  Lincoln wasn’t using these values to argue for foreign military interventionism, since, as perhaps DiLorenzo needs reminding, the Civil War was a “war between the states.” The Gettysburg Address was not some generic speech that could be delivered anywhere in the world to inspire conflict. Rather, it is a deeply and distinctly and American document that reminds us of our historical obligations. And as Edmund Burke teaches us, a regard for the wisdom of history and an effort to preserve the teachings of our ancestors is exactly the opposite of an irreverent relish for revolution.

DiLorenzo goes on to misalign himself with one of my favorite Southern authors, Robert Penn Warren (For my previous post on Warren, see here.) It’s true that Warren had something of an antipathy for self-righteous Northerners, but, in my reading of Warren, he was worried that non-Southerners after the Civil War were estranged from history. He was no apologist for slavery. Rather, Warren feared that without a visceral understanding of the War’s tragedy, which Southerners maintained, Americans would become overly utopian in their political aims. Misreading the capacity of human sin and history’s hold on human communities, Northeasterners like Ralph Waldo Emerson and his post-War descendents could float into a “total abstraction, in the pure blinding light of total isolation.” American idealists attempt to overcome human pain yet end up completely abstracted from real human life and its demands. As a result, Emerson has no practical relevance to the physical, historical reality of life on the ground, where Americans are forced to confront their own lust, dreams, sins and family past. Warren opens a nuanced conversation over whether or not American exceptionalism is valid and what it means for our relationship with history—but that’s an entirely different conversation than the anti-Lincoln debate DiLorenzo tries to inspire.

DiLorenzo cheekily refers to the Civil War as the “War to Prevent Southern Independence” because, like Murray Rothbard, he is suspicious of any and all uses of government force that impede liberty. War, says DiLorenzo, “is invariably waged over some hidden economic agenda for the benefit of the politically-connected class.”

But do you know what else was a racket to benefit a politically-connected class? Slavery. Do you know what else was an impediment to liberty and the spirit of the Declaration? Again, slavery. Ignoring this historical reality in the name of libertarian purity is precisely the kind of abstract idealism that Robert Penn Warren abhorred.